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the minor children. In any event an agreement should not be consid-
ered as a final settlement of the rights of minor children not parties to
the arrangement and to which they are incapable of assenting.2
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INSURANCE
AUTOMOBILE INDEMNITY - GUEST STATUTE
The plaintiff while riding as a guest of one Hickok in Michigan
was injured in an automobile accident. She brought action against
Hickok in Ohio. The jury found that the accident was the result of
the wilful and wanton misconduct of the insured, thus taking the case
out of the operation of the Michigan guest statute (Sec. 4648 Compiled
Laws of Michigan (1929) - relieving the owner or operator of liability
except in cases of gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct),
and gave her judgment. Hickok carried liability insurance with the
Yorkshire Indemnity Company of New York and the plaintiff then
filed against it to recover on the previous judgment. A general demurrer
was entered by the company on the ground that the policy covered only
accidental injuries. From a judgment sustaining the demurrer, the
plaintiff appealed. In reversing the judgment, the court, held that the
injuries resulting from the wilful and wanton misconduct of the insured
were accidental within the meaning of the policy. Herrell v. tickok,
57 Ohio App. 213, 13 N. E. (2nd) 358 (I937). The Supreme Court
affirmed the Appellate Court finding that if the Michigan law was as
alleged in the petition, then, under the law of that state, the injuries
were accidentally sustained. The court said it was unnecessary to decide
whether injuries caused by wilful or wanton misconduct would be
covered by the policy in a case arising in Ohio. Herrell v. Hfickok, 133
Ohio St. 66, II N.E. (2nd) 869 (1937).
In the absence of statute the general rule is that an owner or operator
27 The Committee on Judicial Administration and Legal Reform of the Ohio State
Bar Association has accepted the draft of the Marriage and Divorce Commission appointed
by Gov. White, which will probably be submitted to the General Assembly in the near
future. This statute will eliminate the problems discussed in this note. The proposed
divorce law provides that in an action for divorce, alimony, or annulment the court shall
have the power to raise, lower, or otherwise modify an award of alimony for future
support of the spouse if payable in installments, or an award for support money to minor
children either in installments or in a lump sum, whether or not the award was based
upon a contract between the parties. An award to the spouse of a lump sum to be paid in
installments is not subject to modification when such sum is a final property settlement.
The court will also have the power to equitably adjust arrears of such alimony or payment
to minor children which may have accumulated by reason of the inability of the party to
meet such payments. Proposed Divorce Law, sec. 8b, is Ohio Bar z7. (July 18, 1938).
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of an automobile owes his guest the duty of reasonable care. Sparrow v.
Levine, 19 Ohio App. 94 (1923); Marple v. Haddad, 103 W. Va.
508, 138 S.E. 113, 61 A.L.R. 1248 (1927).
Many states now have guest statutes relieving the owner or operator
of liability to guests except in certain cases, such as those arising out of
gross negligence, wilful and wanton misconduct, or intoxication. Under
Ohio's guest statute, G.C. Sec. 6308-6, the guest can recover only for
wilful and wanton misconduct on the part of the owner or operator.
That guest statutes have been beneficial to the liability insurance
companies is obvious. Only to a guest who can ground his claim on an
exception in the statute, viz., wilful and wanton misconduct, can an
insurance company be held liable, and even then the terminology of
the statute may be such as to encourage the insurer to resist the claim
on the ground that the policy does not cover the risk.
In the case of American Casualty Co. v. Brinsky, 51 Ohio App.
298, 2 Ohio Op. 146, 200 N.E. 654 (1934), a guest, after recovering
against a car owner by basing his claim on the exception in the Ohio
guest statute, was denied recovery from the insurance company. Al-
though the trial court had found the operator guilty of "wilful and
wanton misconduct," the Court of Appeals separated the phrase and
limited itself to the finding that the insurance company was not liable
for the insured's wilful acts. Thus the question of whether the insurance
company would be liable in a case where there was only wanton mis-
conduct was left open. But when this question arose in the appellate case
of R othman v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co., 23 Ohio Law Abs. 2
(1936), it was held that the insurance policy did not cover wanton
misconduct, and recovery was denied the guest. The court, relying upon
the language of Universal Pipe Co. v. Bassett, 130 Ohio St. 567, 5
Ohio Op. 214, 2oo N.E. 843 (936), became confused and held that
"wilfulness" and "wantonness," in effect, were similar. Tying that up
with the holding of the Brinsky Case, supra, the Appellate Court arrived
at its surprising conclusion.
That the Appellate Court in the Rothman Case was not on firm
ground is evident from the fact that Ohio, in other cases, has recognized
a distinction between the terms "wilful misconduct" and "wanton mis-
conduct." In the former it is said that the actor intends the result of his
act while in the latter the actor although having knowledge of the
greater probability of harm from his act, disregards the consequences.
Both involve a higher degree of culpability than that negligence which
is the failure to meet the standard of care required in the usual tort case.
Reserve Trucking Co. v. Fairchild, 128 Ohio St. 519, 191 N.E. 745
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(1934); and see Universal Pipe Co. v. Bassett, supra, at p. 575. In
view of the above, it was not surprising that the Supreme Court to which
the Rothman Case was appealed reversed the Appellate Court. Rothman
v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co., 134 Ohio St. 241, - N.E. -
(1938). The Court found that "wanton misconduct" was not inten-
tional conduct and that an injury growing out of "wanton misconduct"
was accidental within the meaning of the insurance policy. In dictum
the Court remarked, "No one would claim that such policy covers an
injury resulting from a wilful act of the insured, for the term 'wilful
act' implies an intention to cause injury," and cited Commonwealth
Casualty Co. v. Headers, 118 Ohio St. 429, x61 N.E. 278 (1928).
The dictum must at least be comforting to the Appellate Court
which decided the Brinsky case for it was on the Headers case that it
largely relied. In the Headers case it was held that a personal assault
by a taxi-cab driver on another was not an accident because intentional,
and was not covered by the liability policy held by the taxi-cab company.
The weight of authority is dearly opposed to the case, holding, that
where, under an accident insurance policy, the insured is injured as a
result of an intentional act of another without misconduct of the insured
and the injury is unforeseen by the insured, the injury is accidental.
Richards v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 89 Cal. 170, 26 Pac. 762, 23 Am. St.
Rep. 452 (1891); Buckley v. Massachusetts Bonding and Ins. Co.,
113 Wash. 13, 192 Pac. 924 (1920) ; Interstate Business Men's Acci-
dent Association v. Ford, 161 Ky. 163, 170 S.W. 525 (1914); Gen-
eral -Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Corp. v. Hymes, 77 Okla. 20,
185 Pac. 1O85, 8 A.L.R. 318 (1919). The criterion is well stated
by Judge Cardozo in Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co., 232 N.Y.
161, 133 N.E. 432, 19 A.L.R. 876 (1921), where he said, "Injuries
are accidental or the opposite, for the purpose of indemnity, according to
the quality of the results rather than the quality of the causes."
Those policies insuring against accidental injuries should not be
confused with those insuring against injuries due to accidental means.
In the latter the insurer is not liable when the acts were intended
although the results were not expected. Ramsay v. Fidelity and Casualty
Co., 143 Tenn. 42, 223 S.W. 841, 13 A.L.R. 651 (1920); Standard
Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Schmaltz, 66 Ark. 588, 53 S.W. 49,
74 Am. St. Rep. 112 (1899); Olinsky v. Railway Mail Ass'n., 182
Cal. 669, 189 Pac. 835, 14 A.L.R. 784 (1920).
There has been a scarcity of cases on the problem of whether an
automobile liability or indemnity policy covers accidents caused by gross
negligence, wilful or wanton misconduct. Two English cases have held
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that the injuries are accidental when resulting from gross negligence.
Tinline v. I Vhite Cross Ina. Assn., 3 K.B. 327, II B.R.C. 260 (1921)
and James v. British General Ins. Co., 2 K.B. 311 (1927); but see
O'Hearn v. Yorkshire Ins. Co., 51 Ont. L.R. 13o, 67 D.L.R. 735
(1921). Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Welfare Finance Co., 75 Fed.
(2nd) 58 (934) (writ of certiorari denied in 295 U.S. 734, 79 L.
Ed. 1682, 55 S. Ct. 645 (I935), held, in a suit by the insured, that
wanton injuries were included within the meaning of accidental injuries.
The Illinois court, in construing the phrase "wilful and wanton
misconduct," as used in the Illinois guest statute, has found it to mean
such absence of care as indicates a conscious indifference to the conse-
quences. Farley v. Mitchell, 282 Ill. App. 555 (1935); Murphy v.
King, 284 IlL. App. 74, I N.E. (2nd) 268 (1936). Michigan courts
have described it as a reckless disregard for the consequences. Manser v.
Eder, 263 Mich. 107, 248 N.W. 566 (933); McLone v. Bean, 263
Mich. 113, 248 NV. 566 (1933); Goss v. Overton, 266 Mich. 62,
253 N.W. 217 (I934). In Michigan, "wilful and wanton miscon-
duct" and "gross negligence" have been viewed as corresponding terms
but they have been regarded as being more than negligence of any kind,
the law imputing " . . . intention to harm where there is a reckless
disregard for the safety of others." Boyle v. Mosely, 258 Mich. 347
(1932) at p. 350. See also Finkler v. Zimmer, 258 Mich. 336, 241
N.W. 851 (1932). If "wilful and wanton misconduct" is used in the
sense of "gross negligence" then the insurer should be liable for injury
caused in this manner, for "gross negligence" has been construed as
want of slight care and such want of care as to indicate consciousness
of the probable consequences and an indifference to them. (Sherman
and Redfield on the Law of Negligence 6th Ed. (913) , Secs. 49,
748). And, while the Michigan court under the guest statute has
refused to use the term "gross negligence," its definition of "wilful and
wanton misconduct" is virtually the same. See Manser v. Elder, supra;
McLone v. Bean, supra; and Goss v. Overton, supra. See also the Illi-
nois cases Farley v. Mitchell, supra; and Murphy v. King, supra.
The majority of courts, however, do not regard "gross negligence"
and "wilful and wanton misconduct" as being synonymous. Rioko v.
Aijala, 199 N.E. 484 (Mass.) (1936); Desroches v. Holland, 189
N.E. 619 (Mass.) (934); Southern Railway Co. v. Kelley, 52 Ga.
App. 137, 182 S.E. 631 (935). A.L.I. on Torts, Sec. 5oo, states
that the courts often call reckless misconduct "wanton or wilful mis-
conduct," and at p. 1296 the following statement is made: "The dif-
ference between reckless misconduct and conduct involving only such a
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quantum of risk as is necessary to make it negligent is a difference in
the degree of risk, but this difference is so marked (Italics added) as to
amount substantially to a difference in kind."
But, even if courts generally are unwilling to accept the view of
the Michigan and Illinois courts as a rational basis upon which to found
liability upon an insurance policy, there is another satisfactory approach
to the problem. Although "wilful misconduct" theoretically denotes
intent, nevertheless, a great many courts fail to limit it to such narrow
confines. "Failure to use ordinary care to avoid danger after knowl-
edge ... . " of another's danger, "reckless disregard of consequences
after discovering danger," and driving a train when approaching a
crossing at a reckless speed as "habitually done," have been said to fall
within the meaning of the term. Loveless v. Kirk, 34 Ohio L. R. 175
(App.) (1930); Payne v. Vance, 103 Ohio St. 59, 133 N.E. 85
(1921); Hill v. Atlanta Charlotte Air Line Ry. Co., 172 S.C. 408,
174 S.E. 233. "Wilful misconduct" as used by the courts often refers
to the intending of the act and not to the intending of the consequences.
Cook v. Big Muddy Carterville Mining Go., 249 Ill. 41, 94 N.E. 90
(I9ii); Pacific Coast Casualty Co. v. Pillsbury, 31 Cal. App. 701,
162 Pac. 1040 (1916). The latter case, where an errand boy in viola-
tion of express instructions and warnings attempted to run an elevator
and was killed, furnishes a striking example of this. Obviously, there is
a vast difference between intending the act and actually intending or
expecting the harm which results from it. It would be fantastic to believe
that the driver of the car in the principal case actually intended the
accident and the resulting injuries to the plaintiff, especially in view of
the probability of being injured himself. And, as pointed out above, a
majority of the courts are of the opinion that if only the act is intended
and the consequences were neither foreseen nor intended, the injury is
accidental.
In summary, it may be said that the Supreme Court of Ohio in the
Rothman Case, supra, has established the rule that injuries growing out
of "wanton misconduct" are accidental within the meaning of a liability
insurance policy. In dictum it has expressed the view that a liability
policy insuring against "accidental injuries" would not protect a guest
where the insured's act was wilful. This is in line with the Court of
Appeals in the Brinsky Case, supra. But this point still awaits actual
decision by the Supreme Court. Clearly, in a case where "wilful mis-
conduct" is used to mean intending the consequences of the act, no
fault can be found with a holding that the injuries were not accidental.
However, the phrase "wilful misconduct" is a tool which the judicial
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carpenters have used for various purposes. When it is employed to
describe only the intending of the act and not the intending of the
resulting injury, there is good authority for labeling the product "acci-
dental injury." EUGENE STEEL
LANDLORD AND TENANT
REDUCTION OF RENT - CONSIDERATION -A BATEMENT
AFTER FIRE
The plaintiff lessee entered into a written lease with defendant lessor
for a term of 2o years from August, 1928. The lease reserved an
annual rental of $io,ooo a year, payable in nine monthly installments
starting on August 15 of each year. Plaintiff alleged that on November
16, 1934, the lease was modified in writing by the parties so that the
rent reserved was reduced to the sum of $7,200 for the year beginning
August 15, 1934. In May of 1935 a fire destroyed the premises. In
November, 1935, the defendant lessor, having become bankrupt, listed
a claim against plaintiff lessee for rent remaining unpaid at the time of
the fire on the basis of the rent of $io,ooo originally reserved in the
lease. Plaintiff lessee set out the written agreement of November, 1934,
reducing the rent to $7,2oo. Defendant lessor pleaded lack of consid-
eration for the rent reduction. Judgment for the plaintiff lessee was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. This court held that the inability of
the lessee to pay the higher rent, his imminent insolvency, and the desire
of the landlord to retain the lessee as a tenant, constituted a valid con-
sideration for the reduction in rent, and the lessor could not repudiate
the contract. Adams Recreation Palace, Inc. v. Griffith, Trustee, 58
Ohio App. 216, 12 0. Op. 134, 16 N.E. (2d) 489 (1938).
In contract law the rule that payment of part of a debt is not satis-
faction of the whole has long been considered elementary.' But like
many harsh rules of law, this rule has been so amended by exceptions,
both by statute and judicial decision, as to partially or wholly nullify its
effect. So any consideration, however small and insignificant, has been
held to satisfy the rule. Thus a subsequent agreement to pay part of a
debt in satisfaction of the whole is supported by sufficient consideration
if the debtor becomes bound to do anything he was not legally bound
to do by the first agreement. Payment at a different time, in a different
place, or in another manner other than was contemplated in the original
agreement have all been held to constitute sufficient consideration to
1 WILLIETON, CONTRACT:, sec. 120.
